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THE BFOQ DEFENSE: TITLE VII'S CONCESSION TO GENDER
DISCRIMINATION
KATIE MANLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees when making employment decisions.1
Nevertheless, when employers do partake in discriminatory decision-making,
they are offered the statutory defense of the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ). The BFOQ defense allows employers to intentionally discriminate
based on gender by adopting an otherwise facially discriminatory employment
practice if reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.2 While
the Supreme Court has held that this defense should be interpreted narrowly, it
is still available if employers are able to prove that all or substantially all of the
members of one gender cannot successfully perform the job duties essential to
fulfill the employer's primary business function.3 If an employer is successful in
offering the defense, gender discrimination is legally permitted. Thus, by
utilizing the BFOQ defense, employers are permitted to partake in the exact
discriminatory practices that Title VII directly seeks to forbid. Accordingly, Title
VII seems to acknowledge that under certain circumstances discrimination
really is acceptable. However, a deeper examination of these circumstances
invites the question: Should the BFOQ exception still exist?
Because permitting discrimination under Title VII seems fundamentally
contrary to the anti-discrimination purpose of the statute, this article questions
whether the BFOQ defense is consistent with the aims of Title VII or whether, in
actuality, the defense undermines the Act's effectiveness by providing a
loophole for employers to participate in the discriminatory practices Title VII
seeks to forbid. In the end, this article considers four differing viewpoints on the
BFOQ defense: (1) the BFOQ defense should be broadened to represent the
needs of society and the practices that some courts already permit; (2) the
defense should remain as is because it appropriately balances customer and
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
3. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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employer rights against employee rights; (3) the defense is necessary in very
limited circumstances, but the exception should be narrowed to permit
discrimination only in the utmost imperative circumstances; and (4) the BFOQ
defense is inconsistent with the aims of Title VII and should no longer be
permitted.
Although the BFOQ exception is permitted for both religion and national
origin, it is most commonly and most controversially utilized in gender
discrimination suits.4 Therefore, this note will focus solely on the defense as
applied to gender discrimination cases. Part I begins by providing general
information on the BFOQ defense, including a discussion of the BFOQ
framework and the history of the defense. Part II examines the successful and
unsuccessful use of the defense, exploring when employers' motives have
achieved or failed to meet the BFOQ requirements. Part III discusses the
inconsistencies that have occurred in the application of this defense. Because the
BFOQ is available in gender discrimination, but not in race discrimination, Part
IV looks to the reasons Congress provided a gender BFOQ. In response, Part V
posits on the actual and perceived differences between men and women and
considers if any significant differences exist that validate Title VII's
authorization of gender discrimination. Part VI then questions whether the
defense to gender discrimination should still be available. Arguments both for
and against the BFOQ defense are presented, with special thought paid to the
question of whether the defense is actually consistent with Title VII. Finally, this
article concludes that the defense, though unquestionably problematic in theory
and application, is a necessary component for the workability of Title VII.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE
A. Jurisprudence
The BFOQ defense is a statutory defense available under Section 703 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Title VII is the primary federal statute
providing protection against workplace discrimination, mandating:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.6

The Act covers a wide range of employment discrimination claims,
including those based on hiring, firing, promotion, and conditions or benefits of
employment.7 Title VII was enacted in 1964 to "prohibit all practices in whatever
form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination

4.
5.
6.
7.

MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 285–86 (student ed. 1988).
§ 2000e-2(e).
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
Id.
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on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin."8 The bona fide occupational
qualification defense in Title VII allows intentional discrimination in some
circumstances, stating:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter . . . it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.9

Although the defense is available for gender, religion, and national originbased hiring, it is not available in race discrimination cases.10 This suggests that
Title VII's framers believed that racial discrimination was somehow different
than discrimination based upon gender; a belief that it was more valuable or
important to protect against racial discrimination.
The legislative history of the BFOQ defense is limited, sometimes causing
courts to struggle with its interpretation.11 The lack of legislative history is
partially due to the fact that sex discrimination, the main type of case to utilize
the BFOQ, was not originally included in the statutory language of Title VII.12
Instead, Title VII was originally enacted to prevent race, color, origin, and
religious discrimination in employment.13 In a last minute attempt to defeat the
legislation, a House Representative who opposed the bill proposed that the bill
be broadened to include sex in the list of protected categories.14 The House
Judiciary Committee did not hold a hearing on the amendment to add gender
discrimination to Title VII and little discussion of the addition ensued.15 This
effort to thwart the passage of Title VII was unsuccessful, and the bill passed
with the inclusion of sex as a protected category.16 As a result, the legislative
history of the sex discrimination portion of Title VII and the BFOQ defense is
nearly nonexistent. Even the Supreme Court has recognized this limitation,
stating, "we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the
Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'"17

8. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
9. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
10. Id.
11. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (explaining that there is little
legislative history available on the BFOQ defense); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp.
292, 297 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (stating that "Congress provided sparse evidence of its intent when
enacting the BFOQ exception to Title VII.").
12. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 63–64.
13. Id.
14. See W. PEPPER & F. KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: AN ANALYSIS AND
GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONER AND STUDENT 18 (1981) (discussing the fact that the addition of "sex" to the
list of prohibited classification was added in an attempt to prevent the bill). See also Willingham v.
Macon Tel. Publ'g. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the amendment adding
"sex" to the list was a last minute attempt to sabotage the bill).
15. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 297 n.12.
16. Id. at 297.
17. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.

MANLEY__FMT1.DOC

172 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/21/2009 12:43:47 PM

Volume 16:169 2009

Nevertheless, the Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII, submitted by the
Senate Floor Managers of the Civil Rights Bill, does provide some limited
information on the BFOQ.18 The Interpretive Memorandum refers to the BFOQ
as a "limited exception" to the prohibition against discrimination and explains
that employers are given a "limited right to discriminate . . . where the reason for
the discrimination is a bona fide occupational qualification."19 This
Memorandum further detailed some examples of BFOQs that would entail legal
discrimination, including "the preference of a French restaurant for a French
cook, the preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and the
preference of a business which seeks the patronage of members of a particular
religious group for a salesman of the religion. . . ."20 While this memo provides
some instruction on appropriate BFOQ exceptions, it does not provide the indepth understanding necessary to identify the appropriate circumstances in
which the defense may be used.
Although the EEOC guidelines are also not extensive, they have been
crucial in the courts' understanding of the defense since the statute itself offers
little guidance. The EEOC guidelines echo Title VII's directive that "the [BFOQ]
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly."21 The guidelines further
explain that employers many not refuse to hire employees based on stereotyped
characterizations or customer preferences.22 The compliance manual lists only
one area in which a BFOQ is allowable: when necessary for the purpose of
authenticity or genuineness.23 Nevertheless, EEOC discussion letters explain
that other motives, including the psychological needs of clients or customers, are
acceptable BFOQ objectives.24
Although the EEOC guidelines provide guidance to courts interpreting the
BFOQ provision, they are not controlling precedent. In General Electric Co. v
Gilbert, the Supreme Court considered how much deference to give the EEOC's
guidelines, explaining that:
[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [EEOC] under this Act, while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.25

The court went on to find two crucial factors in determining whether a
court should defer to EEOC guidelines: (1) whether the guideline in question is a
contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, and (2) whether the guideline is
consistent or inconsistent with the position that the EEOC held at an earlier date,

18. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 297 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964)).
19. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964)).
20. Id.
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2008).
22. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii)-(iii).
23. § 1604.2(a)(2).
24. See EEOC Informal Discussion Letter, Aug. 22, 2005 (available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
foia/letters/2005/titlevii_bfoq_psychotherapy.html); see also EEOC Informal Discussion Letter,
March 2, 2002 (available at http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2002/titlevii_bfoq.html).
25. 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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closer to the enactment of Title VII.26 These factors suggest that courts should
defer to EEOC's BFOQ guidelines because: (1) the guidelines have been
consistent, not changing since their promulgation,27 and (2) they were
promulgated very close in time to the enactment of Title VII (the same year, in
fact). Thus, courts can place great weight on the EEOC's guidelines when
deciding BFOQ cases.
B. Framework
A plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim by asserting a violation based on
disparate treatment or disparate impact. Under a disparate treatment claim, an
individual argues that he or she was treated differently as a result of his or her
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under this theory, proof of the
employer's discriminatory motive is essential.28 Alternatively, under a claim of
disparate impact, the employment practice appears neutral on its face, but
impacts a protected group more harshly.29 Because the practice is facially
neutral, no proof of discriminatory motive is required. The BFOQ defense is
utilized only when an employer admits to discriminatory practices and,
therefore, should only be raised as a defense to disparate treatment charges.
To establish the prima facie case for disparate treatment, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
with complainant's qualifications.30 Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.31 An employer may state a
variety of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, provided that they are not
pretext.32 Moreover, the employer's justifications do not have to be good
reasons, so long as they are non-discriminatory.33 It is sufficient if the defendant
raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff.34 According to the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, the employer must only "produce admissible evidence which
would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision
had not been motivated by discriminatory animus."35 The plaintiff retains the
burden of persuasion and may succeed "either directly by persuading the court

26. Id. at 142.
27. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 n.15 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
28. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803–05 (1973).
29. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
30. McDonnell Douglass, 411 U.S at 802. This basic prima facie case framework is modified to fit
other employment actions, including promotion, firing, and unequal conditions or privileges of
employment.
31. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 257–58.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 257.
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that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's offered explanation is unworthy of credence."36 The
plaintiff's successfully established prima facie case, joined with sufficient
evidence that the employer's proffered justification was false, permits the trier of
fact to conclude that unlawful discrimination occurred.37
If a plaintiff is successful in making out her prima facie case, an employer
then has the opportunity to raise the BFOQ as an affirmative defense. Here, the
burden of proof falls upon the employer and is difficult to meet.38 Both the
Supreme Court and the EEOC guidelines explain that the BFOQ exception to sex
discrimination should be interpreted narrowly;39 a BFOQ can be established
only when "sex discrimination is 'reasonably necessary' to the 'normal
operations' of the 'particular' business."40
C. The BFOQ Multi-Part Test
The requirements for establishing a BFOQ have evolved over time into a
multi-part test, guided by Supreme Court cases and the BFOQ rules established
within the Age Discrimination Employment Act.41 Courts considering a BFOQ
defense analyze the claim under the "all or substantially all" test and the
"essence of business" test.42 Additionally, courts often consider whether any
reasonable alternatives exist to forgo discriminatory practices.43
Initially, courts constructing a BFOQ standard required that an employer
prove that "all or substantially all women" would be unable to fulfill the
requisite job duties. For example, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co., an employer excluded women from positions requiring employees to lift
more than thirty pounds.44 This practice was rejected because the employer
could not show that almost all women could not lift thirty pounds.45 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that "to rely on the bona fide occupational
qualification exception an employer has the burden of proving that he had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of the job involved."46 The "all or substantially all" test often comes into
dispute when employers attempt to exclude females based on physical ability,
privacy concerns, or where pregnancy poses safety risks. This test presents a
36. Id. at 256.
37. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
38. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989) (explaining that "[w]hen an
employer has asserted that gender is a BFOQ within the meaning of § 703(e), for example, we have
assumed that it is the employer who must show why it must use gender as a criterion in
employment").
39. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2008).
40. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201.
41. 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 404 (4th
ed., 2007).
42. Id. at 405.
43. Id.
44. 408 F.2d 228, 232–34 (5th Cir. 1969).
45. Id. at 235–36.
46. Id at 235.
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large hurdle for employers and is only met if it can be shown that gender is an
"absolute bar to job performance or if virtually all members of one sex are
unable to perform and testing for individual capabilities is not feasible."47 This
"all or substantially all" test makes up one prong of the three part test commonly
employed today.
Two years after establishing the "all or substantially all" test, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals formulated another test, commonly called the "essence
of the business" test, to determine whether a BFOQ was properly established.48
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., Pan Am maintained a policy of
exclusively hiring females for its flight attendant positions.49 The essence of the
business test was established with the court's finding that "[d]iscrimination
based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."50 Although the
court acknowledged that females may be better suited to fulfill the required
duties of the position, this was not enough to fulfill the essence of the business
test:
The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers safely from one
point to another. While a pleasant environment, enhanced by the obvious
cosmetic effect that female stewardesses provide as well as . . . their apparent
ability to perform the non-mechanical functions of the job in a more effective
manner than most men, may all be important, they are tangential to the essence
of the business involved. No one has suggested that having male stewards will
so seriously affect the operation of an airline as to jeopardize or even minimize
its ability to provide safe transportation from one place to another.51

Consequently, job qualifications cannot be based on customer, coworker, or
employer preference. Furthermore, an employer's decrease in profits is not
adequate to support a BFOQ defense.52 In light of these restrictions, the essence
of the business test is considerably difficult to meet. An employer must prove
that gender is absolutely essential to the business' primary function and that
members of the opposite gender could not successfully perform the duties that
constitute the employer's essence of the business.
For many years, the "all or substantially all" and the "essence of the
business" tests were utilized as separate and competing BFOQ tests. However,
in 1977, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court gave express approval to
both standards.53 After the Supreme Court authorized the use of both analyses,
courts began to employ the "all or substantially all" and the "essence of the
business" concurrently. The two tests are easily employed in tandem because
they focus on two different considerations. The "essence of the business" test
considers whether the employee's desired trait is essential for the business to
47. Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 16 (1991).
48. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 409.
49. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
50. Id. at 388.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 n.25 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
53. 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
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run successfully, while the "all or substantially all" test focuses on whether a
class-based ban is the only feasible method of revealing those unable to perform
the job.
Often, courts require a third prerequisite, mandating that defendants also
show that no reasonable, less discriminatory alternative exists, especially in
cases where privacy is at issue.54 For instance, in Hardin v. Stynchcomb, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed the sheriff's department's policy
of rejecting female applicants for the deputy sheriff position.55 There, the
sheriff's department argued that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification
for the job because the available positions were in the male section of the jail.56
In rejecting the BFOQ defense, the court explained that the defendant had not
met its burden of proving that it "could not rearrange job responsibilities in a
way that would eliminate the clash between the privacy interests of the inmates
and the employment opportunities of female deputy sheriffs."57
III. EMPLOYER USE OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE
Employers attempt to evoke the BFOQ defense in a variety of contexts.
However, given that the BFOQ exception is intended to be extremely narrow,
employers' efforts are typically rejected. The defense is generally only successful
in three main contexts: privacy, safety, and authenticity. While employers may,
at times, legally engage in discriminatory hiring practices as a result of these
three concerns, almost any other motive will be refuted. Though gendered
hiring regularly occurs based on stereotypes, customer preference, and the
promotion of sex appeal within businesses that don't primarily sell sex,
employers have been largely unsuccessful in justifying discriminatory hiring
stemming from these motives. The following assessment of successful and
unsuccessful uses of the defense allows an examination of the defense's
legitimacy and assists in explaining whether its tolerance of discriminatory
practices should remain unchanged, be expanded, or restricted.
A. Successful BFOQ Contexts
1. Privacy
Employers are often successful in offering BFOQ defenses based on
legitimate privacy concerns. Although the Supreme Court has never heard a
BFOQ privacy case, it has suggested that such a justification may be one of the
few acceptable BFOQ motives.58 Courts of appeal and lower courts regularly

54. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 412.
55. 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 1366.
57. Id. at 1370–74.
58. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991) (noting that "[n]othing
in our discussion of the 'essence of business test,' however, suggests that sex could not constitute a
BFOQ when privacy interests are implicated").
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recognize this defense when based upon the privacy concerns of third parties.59
Courts differ in their determinations of what privacy interests are legitimate, but
most successful claims are premised upon concerns for bodily privacy when
dealing with fully or partially unclothed patients or customers. A subset of cases
based upon the needs of patients when receiving psychological or role-modeling
services are often considered to fall under the privacy exception. The primary
factor in privacy cases is whether the protection of the privacy interests is
essential to the employer's primary business.60
An employer arguing a BFOQ defense based on privacy must generally
establish three elements: "(1) it has a factual basis for believing that employees of
a particular sex are necessary in order to protect the privacy interests of third
parties involved; (2) the asserted privacy interest is entitled to protection under
the law; and (3) there is no reasonable alternative to protect those privacy
interests other than a sex-based policy."61 In analyzing the third prong of the
test, courts will question whether employers can rearrange job assignments to
prevent privacy problems.62 If such alterations are possible, a BFOQ defense is
more likely to be denied.
Privacy defenses have been upheld in instances where employers require
custodians to be the same sex as those in the facility being cleaned, nurses and
care providers in hospitals and nursing homes to be of the same sex as patients
being assisted, and labor and delivery nurses to be female.63 Courts are often
lenient in permitting BFOQs in health care situations.64 In Fesel v. Masonic Home
of Delaware, Inc., for example, a court considered sex-based hiring permissible,
finding that being a woman was a legitimate BFOQ for an orderly since the
patients would not consent to male workers bathing them or providing any
other intimate-contact services.65
Though privacy-based BFOQ cases often arise in prison settings, the
defense is much more likely to be denied in that environment, in part because of
the lower value courts place on the privacy rights of prisoners. Nonetheless,
courts may still require that prisons rearrange job responsibilities or alter the
environment in order to provide privacy to prisoners during intrusive
situations. For example, in Forts v. Ward, female prisoners complained of privacy
concerns resulting from the staffing of male guards in female housing units
when "inmates were involuntarily exposed to view while partially or completely

59. See Jillian B. Berman, Comment, Defining the "Essence of the Business:" An Analysis of Title VII's
Privacy BFOQ after Johnson Controls, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 749, 752–53 (2000).
60. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 42 at 421.
61. Id. at 418.
62. See, e.g., Olsen v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d. 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999) (finding that being a
female was not a BFOQ for a massage therapist position because of the reasonable alternative that
clients could choose the sex of their therapist).
63. See generally Berman, supra note 59.
64. Id. See also Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd,
591 F.2d. 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Jones v.
Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982).
65. 447 F. Supp. at 1353–54.
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unclothed."66 While the court rejected the inmate's BFOQ argument, it
nonetheless ordered the prison to install shower screens and provide sleeping
garments for inmates.67
Both courts and the EEOC have recognized the validity of employers' use
of a BFOQ defense, falling under the privacy exception, when based upon role
modeling or counseling. Although the EEOC recognizes that "the psychological
needs of an employer's clients or customers can make sex a BFOQ," it places
significant burdens on employers to argue the defense.68 In order for an
employer to defend based upon the BFOQ, the EEOC mandates "medical
evidence from the employer that the employer's clients have psychosocial need
for a same-sex role model," provided by a doctor, psychiatrist, or psychologist.69
Some courts, however, have been quite lenient in this area, allowing
employers to succeed with a BFOQ defense without any scientific proof or
psychological testimony of its necessity.70 For instance, in Healey v. Southwood
Psychiatric Hospital, a female child-care specialist brought a sex discrimination
suit against her employer for assigning her the night shift because she was a
female.71 The hospital in turn argued that it was necessary to have a female on
shift to care for the sexually abused female patients.72 The Third Circuit agreed,
finding that role modeling was an important part of the position and that
workers of the same gender as the patients made better role models.73 The court
found it important that the essence of Southwood's business was "to treat
emotionally disturbed and sexually abused adolescents and children."74
Additionally, the court explained that the hospital was justified in gender-based
hiring because "children who have been sexually abused will disclose their
problems more easily to a member of a certain sex, depending on their sex and
the sex of the abuser."75 Another example of the role modeling defense is
illustrated in City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.76
There, the City of Philadelphia partook in discriminatory hiring practices by
restricting supervision of juvenile detainees to employees of the same sex as the
detainees.77 The court found that objective, empirical evidence was not
necessary to prove a BFOQ and that common sense evidence would suffice ; "[a]
common sense [belief] that a young girl with a sexual or emotional problem will

66. 621 F.2d 1210, 1213 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 1216–17.
68. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 625.8(a)(2), at 625:0017 (April 1982).
69. Id. See also EEOC Dec. LA 68-4-538E, 2 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 537, 537–38 (1969)
(stating that a gender BFOQ was not valid when the disputed job position involved only minimal
interaction between the employee and the supervised children, since the "children's presumed need
for association with a 'male-image' would not be satisfied by the incumbency of a male at the
supervisory position at issue herein").
70. See, e.g., Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978).
71. 78 F.3d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 1996).
72. Id. at 132–33.
73. Id. at 134.
74. Id. at 132.
75. Id. at 133.
76. 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
77. Id. at 98–99.
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usually approach someone of her own sex . . . seeking comfort and answers" was
sufficient to establish a BFOQ. 78 In justifying this decision, the court further
explained, "to expect a female or male supervisor to gain the confidence of
troubled youths of the opposite sex in order to be able to alleviate emotional and
sexual problems is to expect the impossible."79
As previously discussed, BFOQ defenses are not normally available when
based upon the privacy concerns of prison inmates. However, if the concerns for
privacy are based on rehabilitation needs, courts are more likely to permit a
BFOQ defense. For example, in Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social
Services, male correctional officers brought suit against the prison for hiring only
women to work in the women's maximum security prison's living units.80
Though the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the prisons'
justifications of prison security and inmate privacy did not qualify as proper
BFOQ defenses, they affirmed that the motive of inmate rehabilitation did.81 The
court found that the essence of the prison's business was to rehabilitate its
prisoners.82 Because a high percentage of the female inmates had been
physically and sexually abused by men, "the presence of unrelated males in
living spaces where intimate bodily functions take place [was] a cause of stress
to females."83 What's more, the Seventh Circuit rejected a requirement of
empirical evidence, finding instead that deference to the professional judgment
of the superintendent was of higher importance.84 Though the case was
remanded to the district court to determine if the rehabilitation rationale was a
proper BFOQ, the court of appeals sent a strong message that several other
courts have since followed.85 Thus, within the prison context, privacy needs
based upon successful rehabilitation hold greater weight than those based on
privacy alone.
2. Safety
Defenses founded on reasonable safety concerns are also permitted by
courts in rare circumstances. Employers citing a genuine need to protect the
safety of those other than an affected employee are generally successful in
establishing a BFOQ.86 However, courts have universally rejected discriminatory
employment practices when based solely on the safety of the employee, given

78. Id. at 103 (explaining that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Committee could not "expect
the City to produce cold, empirical facts").
79. Id.
80. 859 F. 2d 1523, 1524 (7th Cir. 1988).
81. Id. at 1529–30.
82. Id. at 1530.
83. Id. at 1531.
84. Id. at 1532 (finding it an unfair and unrealistic burden to require the defendants to produce
objective evidence, from empirical studies or otherwise).
85. See, e.g., Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998).
86. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
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that Title VII vests individuals with the power to take on unsafe tasks.87
Furthermore, a BFOQ based on the safety of third parties is not proper unless
the safety is "indispensable to the particular business at issue."88 For example, in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court allowed a safety-based BFOQ after
finding that the essence of a correction officer's job was to maintain prison
security.89 Although the Court recognized that "the BFOQ exception [is] in fact
meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex," it nevertheless upheld the defense due the
"peculiarly inhospitable" environment of the prison, characterized by a "jungle
atmosphere" and "rampant violence."90
The upholding of a gender BFOQ based on safety is quite rare, however,
because there are few situations in which an employer can prove that the hiring
of women is actually unsafe. The only other cases, outside of Dothard, where
employers have successfully evoked safety BFOQ defenses have been due to
pregnant women's reduced capabilities. In several cases airline policies
prohibiting pregnant flight attendants from working have been upheld because
of the safety concerns created for passengers if pregnant flight attendants could
not properly perform their roles in emergency situations.91
One important area of concern within safety-based BFOQ cases involves
discriminatory hiring in an effort to protect the safety of unborn children.
Although this is undoubtedly an important interest to protect, courts reject
BFOQ defenses based on fetal safety concerns because "unconceived fetuses
of . . . female employees . . . are neither customers nor third parties whose safety
is essential to the business . . . ."92 For example, in International Union v. Johnson
Controls, a class of female employees sued their employer because of its fetalprotection policy that excluded fertile woman from positions found to expose
unconceived fetuses to harm.93 The fetal-protection policy, in reality, created a
near blanket prohibition against the placement of women in many positions,
since the employer considered a woman of any age or status fertile, unless
medical documentation provided otherwise.94 In rejecting Johnson Controls'
BFOQ defense, the Supreme Court noted the discrimination present in this
policy, given that "[f]ertile men, but not fertile women, [were] given a choice as
87. See, e.g., Crane v. Vision Quest Nat'l, No. 98-4797, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12357 (E.D. Pa.
2000); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating, "Title VII
rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead vests individual
women with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks. Men have always had
the right to determine whether the incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous,
obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women
are now to be on equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including the bona fide occupational
qualification exception Congress intended to renege on that promise.").
88. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991).
89. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
90. Id. at 334–35.
91. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980);
Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977).
92. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203.
93. Id. at 192.
94. Id.
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to whether they wish[ed] to risk their reproductive health for a particular job."95
Thus, an employer is prohibited from "discriminating against a woman because
of her capacity to become pregnant unless her reproductive potential prevents
her from performing the duties of her job."96 Accordingly, gender-based hiring
attributed to fetal safety concerns will only be upheld under the BFOQ defense if
an employer can prove that there is a safety risk for someone other than the
employee or employee's unconceived fetus. This value judgment suggests that
courts consider non-discriminatory hiring to be of the significant importance, or
at least of a higher priority than safety concerns for future children.
3. Authenticity
In circumstances where gender-based hiring is necessary for the purpose of
authenticity or genuineness, the courts and the EEOC expressly permit sexbased BFOQs.97 For example, the EEOC guidelines explicitly permit an
employer to make a hiring decision based upon gender when selecting an actor
or actress for the authenticity of the production.98 Here, an employer must still
pass the three BFOQ tests: (1) that all or substantially all members of the
opposite gender are unable to perform in the role; (2) that the essence of the
business would be undermined without the sex-based hiring decisions; and (3)
that no reasonable alternative to the discriminatory hiring exists. This argument
may be successful when hiring performers, actors, or other entertainers for
gender-based roles, and could even be accepted for sexual entertainment roles
where the selling of sex is not the essence of the employer's business.99
Nevertheless, this allowance is restrictive and is not meant to shelter those using
authenticity as a guise for hiring to cater to customer preference or to sell sex
appeal in non-sex based businesses. For instance, in an action against Joe's Stone
Crab restaurant, the EEOC filed suit against Joe's, alleging that it discriminated
against women applicants in its hiring practices.100 Shortly before this suit was
filed, all 108 food servers were male.101 Joe's argued that its hiring practices were
not intended to discriminate against women, but instead were employed to
create an "Old World" ambience modeled after the highest-quality restaurants in
Europe.102 In rejecting the defense, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
that if the male-only hiring practice was a form of intentional sex discrimination,
as the district court found on remand, it would not be protected under the
authenticity exceptions of the BFOQ defense.103 Thus, only in circumstances
95. Id. at 197.
96. Id. at 206.
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2008). See, e.g., Button v. Rockefeller, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 488 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973)(finding that gender-based hiring was necessary for undercover detective assignments);
Util. Workers v. S. Cal. Edison, 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
98. § 1604.2(a)(2).
99. See Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcakes: Exclusive Hiring Arrangement and Sexy Dress Codes,
14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 257, 269.
100. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1267.
102. Id. at 1270 (explaining that the district court had found that Joe's "sought to emulate Old
World traditions by creating an ambience in which tuxedo-clad men served its distinctive menu").
103. Id. at 1282–85; E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1313 (2001).
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where discriminatory hiring practices are needed for legitimate and genuine
authenticity concerns will a BFOQ defense likely be upheld.
B. Unsuccessful BFOQ Arguments
Although circumstances falling within the three areas of privacy, safety,
and authenticity allow employers to make discriminatory hiring decisions,
courts overwhelmingly find other employer motives to be illegitimate.
Commonly prohibited motivations for gender-based hiring include stereotypes,
customer preference, and the promoting of sex appeal in businesses that do not
primarily sell sex appeal. While these motives may exist individually, it is not
uncommon for them to act in concert within a single scenario. For example,
employers often choose to hire men based upon the stereotype that they are
stronger, as well as to suit customer preferences (since customers also make
preference decisions based upon the same stereotypes that employers operate
under). Similarly, an employer hoping to hire females to promote their sex
appeal would, in reality, likely be doing so because of his belief that the majority
of customers would prefer women employees. While this note discusses
stereotypes, customer preference, and the promotion of sex appeal as distinct
issues, it is clear from the subsequent examples that these motives often work in
tandem to produce discriminatory hiring practices.
1. Stereotypes
Employer defenses of discriminatory hiring practices blatantly based upon
stereotypes will almost always be rejected. Permitting a sex-based defense
founded upon stereotypes would blatantly conflict with Title VII's purpose "to
overcome stereotyped thinking about the job abilities of the sexes."104 Courts
have also cited concerns over stereotypes based on paternalistic beliefs that
women should be protected from dangerous and stressful work environments:
Title VII rejects [] this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and
instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take
on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious,
boring or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that
women are now to be on equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including
the bona fide occupational qualification exception Congress intended to renege
on that promise.105

The EEOC guidelines also prohibit stereotypes as valid BFOQs, stating that
"[t]he refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes" will not merit a BFOQ exception.106
Several noteworthy BFOQ cases address the forbiddance of stereotype
BFOQ defenses. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., Southern Bell
argued that its exclusion of women from positions requiring employees to lift

104.
105.
106.

Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 n.21 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (2008).
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more than thirty pounds was protected under the BFOQ defense.107 There, the
court explained that an employer must demonstrate that he has a "reasonable
cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved."108 In rejecting Southern Bell's BFOQ claim, the court stated:
Southern Bell has clearly not met that burden here. They introduced no evidence
concerning the lifting abilities of women. Rather, they would have us "assume,"
on the basis of a "stereotyped characterization" that few or no women can safely
lift 30 pounds, while all men are treated as if they can. . . . What does seem clear
is that using these class stereotypes denies desirable positions to a great many
women perfectly capable of performing the duties involved.109

Thus, an employer's BFOQ claims must be premised on facts, not
commonly held gender stereotypes. In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Pan
American was charged with sex discrimination for its employment policy of
hiring only women as in-flight cabin attendants.110 Pan-American's BFOQ
argument for its gender-based hiring was twofold, citing both customer
preference and the stereotyped belief that women were innately better "in the
sense that they were superior in such non-mechanical aspects of the job as
'providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized
service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as possible. . . .'"111 Though
the court "recognize[d] that the public's expectation of finding one sex in a
particular role may cause some initial difficulty," such stereotyped views of
gender roles were not found to be a valid basis for the BFOQ defense.112
Accordingly, courts hold that employers may not evoke the BFOQ defense when
it is premised on stereotyped thinking.
2. Customer Preference
Courts also normally reject BFOQ defenses based solely on customer
preference, explaining that "it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow
the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices
the Act was meant to overcome."113 Although customers often prefer that
employers hire employees of one gender over the other, these preferences alone
are typically insufficient to establish a BFOQ.114 The EEOC guidelines echo this
sentiment, stating that "the refusal to hire an individual because of the
preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers" will not merit a
BFOQ exception.115 In one of the most well known BFOQ cases, Southwest

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

408 F.2d at 235–36.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 387.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 389.
Id. But see infra Section III.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (2008).
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Airlines was charged with gender discriminatory hiring practices for hiring only
females for flight attendant and ticketing agent positions.116 Southwest argued
that it should be permitted to "discriminate against males because its attractive
female flight attendants and ticket agents personif[ied] the airline's sexy image
and fulfill[ed] its public promise to take passengers skyward with 'love.'"117
Southwest offered further proof that the company's success was highly
dependent upon its marketing strategy of selling "love" through the services of
its attractive female employees.118 While the court acknowledged that
Southwest's marketing strategy of providing customers with "eye candy" might
be preferred by passengers, it found the BFOQ defense invalid because selling
love or sex appeal was not Southwest's primary business.119 Southwest's defense
was further rejected because a man could perform the requisite job duties of a
flight attendant or ticket agent.120 Accordingly, the Court explained, "sex does
not become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit female
sexuality as a marketing tool or to better ensure profitability."121
This prohibition against BFOQ defenses based upon customer preference is
well established. Consequently, it is rare for employers to argue BFOQs based
upon customer preference without blanketing their motivations with another
purpose. Nevertheless, in Part III, this note addresses the fact that courts do not
always apply this rule consistently, since some courts have permitted BFOQ
defenses based on customer preference.
3. The Selling of Sex Appeal in Businesses that Do Not Primarily Sell Sex
Another common motive for discriminatory hiring occurs when employers
wish to hire employees on account of their sex appeal. Employers often realize
that staffing their businesses with sexy employees attracts additional customers
and increases business. This tactic is more often aimed at male customers
through the hiring of attractive female employees. However, even if a company
uses sex to market services or products, that alone is not enough to permit a
BFOQ defense. This motive was certainly at play when the court rejected
Southwest Airlines' BFOQ defense. Southwest hired female employees in an
effort to increase sales through the promotion of its "love" image.122 There,
Southwest's image and advertising were permeated by sex.123 Their television
commercials focused on attractive female flight attendants assisting male
passengers with a voice-over guaranteeing "in-flight love."124 The airline served
"love bites" (almonds) and "love-potions" (cocktails) and used a "quickie

116. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
117. Id. at 293.
118. Id. at 295.
119. Id. at 302.
120. Id. (stating, "[T]he ability of the airline to perform its primary business function, the
transportation of passengers, would not be jeopardized by hiring males.").
121. Id. at 303.
122. See generally id.
123. Id. at 294 n.4. (stating that "Unabashed allusions to love and sex pervade all aspects of
Southwest's public image.").
124. Id.
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machine" (ticketing machine) to provide "instant gratification" (quick service).125
Even though Southwest utilized sex as its primary method of advertising, and a
significant portion of their success resulted from the sex appeal of the
employees, this still was not enough to allow a BFOQ because Southwest was
not in the business of selling sex.126
Though businesses that do not primarily sell sex are prohibited from
making sexually discriminatory hiring decisions, businesses whose "essence" is
the actual selling of sex are permitted to hire based upon gender. According to
the court in Wilson v. Southwest Airline Co., a BFOQ defense based upon sex
appeal is permitted where "vicarious sex entertainment is the primary service
provided" and "female sexuality [is] reasonably necessary to perform the
dominate purpose of the job which is forthrightly to titillate and entice male
customers."127 Thus, a strip club that hires only women to perform as exotic
dancers or a gentleman's club employing only females as topless waitresses can
still shield discrimination suits by employing the BFOQ defense. Considering
that the defense is quite attainable when a business's main service is the selling
of sexual entertainment, opponents of the BFOQ often focus upon its frequent
use in sexually denigrating situations, especially highlighting the resulting
subordination of women.128
The determination of whether sexual entertainment is the primary product
or service of a business is challenging, however, because many businesses teeter
on this edge, offering services that are laced with sex appeal. An often cited
example of this practice is Hooters' policy of hiring only female waitresses. 129
Hooters is a favored eating establishment for male clientele precisely because of
its scantily clad female servers. Hooters unquestionably draws larger crowds,
earns higher profits, and achieves increased popularity as a result of the sexual
promotion of its waitresses.130 While the female servers may be preferred by the
majority of customers and thus increase business, Hooters primary business is
the serving of food and beverages to customers, not the serving of sex appeal.
Although there has never been a court decision on the merits of Hooters' hiring
practices, the company was sued in 1994 for its gender discriminatory hiring.131
Hooters raised the BFOQ exception as a defense, but eventually entered into a
3.75 million dollar settlement that permitted the company to continue excluding
125. Id.
126. Id. at 302.
127. Id. at 301.
128. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1003, 1027(1986) ("The statutory model of equal protection is riddled with exceptions
that perpetuate women's subordination, the most egregious of which is that sex-specific employment
discrimination claims under Title VII can be defended with arguments of "bona fide occupational
qualification.").
129. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 204 (2004); Rachel L. Cantor, Comment: Consumer Preference for Sex
and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
493, 493–94 (1999).
130. See About Hooters, http://www.hooters.com/About.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) ("The
'nearly world famous' Hooters Girls are the cornerstone of the Hooters concept.").
131. Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93 C 7709, 1994 WL 113079 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1994) (dismissed on
procedural grounds).
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men from its server positions, but mandated the creation of gender neutral
positions for bartenders and hosts.132 If taken to court, it is unlikely that Hooters
could successfully defend its hiring practices based upon the BFOQ, considering
that its primary business is not the selling of sexual entertainment.
IV. INCONSISTENCIES WITHIN BFOQ CASE LAW
Although some believe the BFOQ's regulations are straight forward, in
application, the BFOQ is riddled with inconsistencies. Unsurprisingly, courts
have allowed their own values and beliefs to infiltrate their decisions. This is
problematic, given that some courts' rulings are jurisprudentially inconsistent
and some cases directly contradict each other. Most inconsistencies can be found
within the privacy BFOQ exception, likely because popularly held privacy
beliefs often conflict with Title VII's forbiddance of gender-based hiring.
Although it is not unordinary to see such variations within an area so heavily
influenced by personal beliefs and stereotypes, for some, these discrepancies
undermine the value of the statute. Accordingly, some scholars argue that these
inconsistencies demonstrate a serious application problem, and use this to
bolster their arguments that the BFOQ exception should be completely
eliminated or significantly reduced.133 For others, however, these inconsistencies
actually illustrate the need for the BFOQ defense, as many of the cases below
illustrate a strong need for gender-based hiring.134 Finally, some maintain that
these inconsistencies prove the need for an expansion of the BFOQ defense,
especially since many of the discrepancies found in the cases below result from
courts' attempts to circumvent the statute due to their strongly held beliefs that
gender-based hiring is imperative, at least within the privacy field.135 Those
arguing for an expansion of the defense explain that the statute should be
modified to represent the needs of employers and consumers and the practices
that courts actually permit.136 Thus, it is important to recognize the discrepancies
present in the case law.
A. Privacy BFOQ Contradictions
Although courts regularly uphold BFOQ defenses based upon privacy,
some scholars argue that privacy motives are little more than customer

132. See Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment: Can It Support A
Hostile Work Environment Claim Brought By A Nude Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. REV L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 293
n.122 (1998).
133. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257 (2003); Jillian B. Berman, Comment, Defining the "Essence of the Business": An
Analysis of Title VII's Privacy BFOQ after Johnson Controls, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 749 (1999); Deborah A.
Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical Framework for Reconciling
Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985); Elsa M. Shartsis, Comment, Privacy as Rationale for
the Sex-Based BFOQ, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 865 (1985).
134. Ashlie E. Case, Comment, Conflicting Feminisms and the Rights of Women Prisoners, 17 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 309 (2005).
135. Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposal for Expansion of the Privacy
BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 357 (2004).
136. Id. at 391.
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preference and stereotype motives in disguise.137 In reality, almost anytime that
an employer is arguing for the privacy of its clientele, the concern is based upon
the privacy preferences of its customers.138 Moreover, these privacy preferences
are often founded upon stereotyped assumptions of the sexes. This is
problematic, however, given that customer preferences and stereotypes have
been expressly denied as valid BFOQ motives.
1. Privacy BFOQ Cases are Inconsistent with Non-Privacy BFOQ Cases
The confusion over the privacy BFOQ begins with the initial problem that
court decisions allowing privacy BFOQs do not seem to square with non-privacy
BFOQ cases. Courts have been explicitly clear that customer preference and
stereotype motives do not permit BFOQ defenses.139 Most notable are the widely
cited airline cases, previously discussed, where airlines' attempts to hire women
based upon customer preferences were rejected, even after providing proof that
gender-based hiring contributed to the success of their businesses.140 In Diaz v.
Pan-American World Airways, Inc., for example, the airline introduced evidence of
a survey finding that "79% of the passengers surveyed, male and female,
prefer[ed] being served by a female stewardess to a male steward," along with
expert psychological evidence explaining passengers' preference for female
flight attendants.141 Although the Fifth Circuit agreed that customers might
prefer female flight attendants, Pan-American's defense was nevertheless
rejected.142 Some courts have come down even stronger against these motives.
For example, in Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., the employer failed to promote a
female employee to the position of vice-president of Internal Operations because
the position required interaction with Latin American clients, who would
respond negatively to a woman in the position.143 Although the case was
decided upon other grounds, the court stated, in dicta, that sex was not a BFOQ
for the position.144 In deciding this, the court wholly disagreed with the lower
court's finding that a BFOQ is permitted if "no customer will do business with a
member of one sex either because it would destroy the essence of the business or
would create serious . . . efficacy problems."145 The court instead found that even
in this situation, customer preferences based on sexual stereotypes could not
justify discrimination."146 In light of these cases and many other non-privacy
BFOQ cases, it is clearly established that customer preferences and stereotypes
do not permit a BFOQ.

137. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 129; Cantor, supra note 129, at 502–03.
138. See Cantor, supra note 129, at 502–03.
139. See supra Part II(B).
140. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
141. 311 F. Supp. 559, 565–66 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
142. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389.
143. 653 F.2d 1273, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 1981).
144. Id. at 1276–77.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1277.

MANLEY__FMT1.DOC

188 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/21/2009 12:43:47 PM

Volume 16:169 2009

2. Courts Deciding Privacy BFOQ Cases Require Conflicting Levels and Types
of Proof
When courts have upheld privacy-based BFOQs, they have been
inconsistent in their requirements of both the type and the level of proof
necessary to establish the defense. While several courts have allowed customer
preference and stereotype motives in privacy cases, others have not. Some
courts have permitted a privacy BFOQ when an employer has shown that clients
would not consent to services provided by a member of the opposite sex, but
other courts have required employers to show that customers would stop
utilizing their services altogether. Alternatively, other courts have found that
even in privacy situations, no amount of proof will overcome the prohibition
against customer preference and stereotype BFOQs. What's more, although
some courts have required employers to present statistical evidence of their
customers' demands, other courts have not. Such discrepancies are disconcerting
both for employers hoping to utilize the defense and for those questioning its
validity.
A comparison of cases illustrates the inconsistencies described above. In
Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, a court permitted a BFOQ for the position of
obstetrical nurse partly based upon the evidence of a doctor testifying that one
half of her patients and more than one half of her clients' husbands would object
to treatment by a male nurse.147 Similarly, in Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware,
Inc., the court found a nursing home's sex-based hiring of women permissible
since many of the female patients would not consent to male workers providing
intimate-contact services, and some stated they would leave the home if male
nurses or aides were hired.148 Although not all of the female residents were
polled, the court found the Assistant Superintendent's testimony sufficient that
"it was her belief that the female guests would not accept personal care from
male nurse's aides."149 Clearly, customer preference was accepted as a legitimate
motive for the gender-based hiring in both cases. Nevertheless, Griffin v.
Michigan Department of Corrections illustrates a striking contrast.150 In Griffin, the
court quickly rejected a prison's gender-based hiring policy prohibiting women
from working within residential units.151 The court found that the policy was
illegally "based on a stereotypical sexual characterization that a viewing of an
inmate while nude or performing bodily functions, by a member of the opposite
sex, is intrinsically more odious than the viewing by a member of one's own
sex,"152 and this was "just the type of stereotypical value system condemned by
Title VII."153 Although the privacy rights of prisoners are less than those of the
general public, the statements of the court directly contradict Backus and Fesel. In
both Backus and Fesel the courts did expressly what the Griffin court forbid; they
each accepted the stereotypical sexual characterization that a nurse of the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

510 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352–54 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1352.
654 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Id. at 705.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
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opposite sex viewing a nude patient was intrinsically more odious than the
viewing by a member of one's own sex.154 Adding further inconsistency, in
Slivka v. Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, the West Virginia State Supreme Court
ruled against a hospital attempting to utilize a privacy-based BFOQ.155 In that
case, the hospital had a policy of hiring only female obstetrics nurses.156 In
defense of its policy the hospital provided evidence that "80 [percent] of patients
objected to having a male nurse[,]" and male physicians requested female nurses
as chaperones in their rounds.157 Even with this evidence, the court struck down
the policy citing a lack of information.158 While the hospital's BFOQ defense was
not found sufficient, the court explained that there could be situations in which
privacy interests would trump those of equal opportunity employment.159 The
inconsistent holdings of Backus, Fesel, Griffin, and Slivka make privacy-based
BFOQ requirements even more unclear.
Courts are also inconsistent in the type of proof necessary to uphold a
BFOQ defense, with some requiring direct statistical proof of the BFOQ
necessity, and others completely ignoring this requirement. Non-privacy cases
have required that employers have "a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all [men or women] would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved."160 However, in Fesel, the court found
that the Assistant Superintendent's personal belief that women patients would
not consent to cross-sex care was sufficient.161 Similarly, in Torres v. Wisconsin
Department of Health & Social Services, the court granted a BFOQ defense based
on rehabilitation without any showing of empirical evidence, finding that the
"professional judgment" of the superintendent was of higher importance.162
Evidently, the same proof that some courts accept as sufficient to permit a
BFOQs, others reject as insufficient.
Although courts are unquestionably inconsistent in their application of the
privacy BFOQ, the extent of the privacy breach seems to weigh heavily in their
decisions. When privacy breaches are minimal, courts are much less likely to
grant BFOQ defenses. For example, in EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., an employer
maintained a policy of hiring only females for weight loss counselor positions.163
HI 40 Corporation argued that some customers believed having their body

154. See generally Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark 1981); Fesel v.
Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
155. Slivka v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp., 594 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2004).
156. Id. at 617–18.
157. Id. at 623.
158. Id. at 623–24.
159. Id. at 624 (stating that "[D]iscrimination may be valid in instances when privacy interests
trump the principle of equal employment opportunity. And while accommodation or balancing of
both issues is the goal, it is not always practicable.").
160. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Int'l Union v.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991).
161. 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
162. 859 F.2d 1523, 1530–32 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding it an unfair and unrealistic burden to require
the defendants to produce objective evidence, from empirical studies or otherwise).
163. 953 F. Supp. 301, 302 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
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measurements taken by men would be a privacy intrusion.164 There, the court
stated that "[a] minimal intrusion on the privacy of customers must be tolerated
if the elimination of that intrusion 'tramples' the employment opportunities" of
men.165 Whatever the reason, the discrepancy in the aforementioned privacy
cases is apparent both when they are compared to non-privacy BFOQ cases and
when they are compared to other privacy cases.
Furthermore, many privacy concerns are the result of gender stereotypes,
which have been expressly denied as BFOQ motives.166 This problem is
exemplified in the common double standard treatment of male and female
employees in privacy BFOQ cases. In most of the privacy BFOQ cases,
employers maintain policies preventing men from cross-viewing positions, but
not all prevent women from corresponding cross-viewing positions.167 Society
seems to be much more accepting of women providing intimate care for men,
than it is of men providing intimate care for women, and this acceptance is
noticeable in courts decisions. Accordingly, health care employers are more
likely to ban male care providers from the intimate care of female patients than
to ban females from the intimate care of male patients. Part of this difference can
likely be accounted for by the stereotypical belief that women are better suited
for caretaking and nursing positions. This difference could also be attributed to
the societal conception that men, unlike women, cannot stifle their sexual
thoughts from surfacing while at work. Men are often stereotyped as sexually
motivated, having "one-track minds" that cannot stop them from ogling the
naked female body. Whatever the reason, these stereotypes result in a
discriminatory double standard in hiring and staffing procedures. Serious
concerns arise when privacy BFOQs are actually premised upon stereotypes,
however, since this contradicts the express rejection of stereotypes as valid
BFOQ motives.
3. Privacy BFOQ Cases Do Not Meet the Essence of the Business Test
Even if we find that privacy concerns are based upon something other than
customer preferences or stereotypes, opponents further argue that privacybased BFOQs do not pass the main hurdle of a valid BFOQ defense- the "essence
of the business" test. Under the test, employers must show that employees of
one gender cannot successfully perform the job duties essential to fulfill the
employer's primary business function.168 However, in most privacy cases, an
employer's business would not be undermined without gender-based hiring.
For example, the essence of a hospital's business is to provide medical services
for patients, the essence of a nursing home is to provide care for its patients, and
the essence of a janitorial business is to provide cleaning services. In each of
these examples, the fulfillment of the essence of the business could be achieved
without gender-based hiring. Though some may argue that a hospital or nursing
164. Id. at 303–304.
165. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
166. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 n.21 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
167. See, e.g., Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. at 302–303; Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
168. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
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home's primary business is to provide services with the promise of privacy, this
broader reading of the essence of the business test seems forbidden by Johnson
Controls. There, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's BFOQ argument
that the essence of its business was to make batteries in an industrially safe
manner, without harming unborn children.169 Instead, the Court found that the
essence of a business was to be interpreted narrowly, meaning that Johnson
Controls' essence was solely that of manufacturing batteries.170 In reaching this
decision, the Court explained:
[T]he safety exception is limited to instances in which sex . . . actually interferes
with the employee's ability to perform the job. This approach is consistent with
the language of the BFOQ provision itself, for it suggests that permissible
distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the
job.171

If privacy BFOQ defenses have synonymous requirements, employers
should be required to show that sex actually interferes with the employee's
ability to perform the job. Since privacy BFOQs are not based upon the
employees' abilities, but instead are needed to fulfill third party desires, it is
unclear whether this is, in fact, a valid BFOQ under the Supreme Court's
precedent. For this reason, the privacy defense is difficult to reconcile with the
Supreme Court's narrow reading of the essence of business analysis.
4. Many Privacy Concerns Could be Resolved by Rearranging Work Assignments
Finally, if privacy defenses do meet the essence of the business test, there is
yet another discrepancy between privacy and non-privacy BFOQ cases.
Normally, courts require employers to show that no reasonable alternative to
gender-based hiring exists.172 However, many privacy requests could be fulfilled
by rearranging the work assignments of current employees. When an employer
need only rearrange the duties of existing staff to alleviate customer privacy
concerns, a privacy BFOQ defense directly contradicts the requirement that no
reasonable alternative to the discriminatory hiring exists.
Even if employers were required to equally hire both women and men,
most could arrange tasks to allow for the privacy of patients. However, current
BFOQ jurisprudence only requires that no reasonable alternative exist.173
Nevertheless, it is still unclear what alternatives courts will find reasonable.
Although gender-neutral hiring prevents discrimination, for some employers it
is both wasteful and expensive. For example, a hospital or nursing home could
be required to equally hire and staff male and female nurses. In situations where
a male nurse could not fulfill all of the caretaking duties, a female nurse could
be on hand to assist. Although this would require some employers to staff an
additional employee, it is a potential resolution to the privacy concerns of

169. Id. at 204–206.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 204.
172. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1415–16 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982).
173. Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1415–16.
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employers and their customers. Although many employers would consider this
requirement quite burdensome, it is possible that courts would deem it
reasonable based on the high value of equal opportunity employment.
Alternatively, employers could transfer discrimination costs directly to
patients. For example, in Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, the Professional
Nurses Registry maintained a system where private nurses were hired without
regard for sex.174 Even if a patient requested a nurse of a specific gender, the first
available nurse was sent. If, on arrival, the patient was not satisfied, the nurse
could be rejected, but the patient was required to pay for the nurse's full day of
services.175 Programs such as this shift the costs of discrimination to patients or
customers, instead of placing them on employees. This type of system would
allow men and women equal opportunities in hiring, but could still sometimes
result in unequal work experience. Nevertheless, strategies that transfer the
costs to patients are a controversial solution, given that not all patients with
privacy concerns can afford to finance such requests. Accordingly, it is again
unclear whether courts would consider this a reasonable requirement.
Regardless of whether additional staffing requirements or cost shifting are
reasonable tactics, the simple rearranging of work assignments could have
reasonably resolved privacy concerns in some of the cases where courts
permitted a privacy BFOQ. Given that most courts, at least outside of the
privacy area, require employers to show that there is no reasonable alternative
to a sex-based policy,176 this illustrates yet another inconsistency with privacybased BFOQs.
B. Safety BFOQ Contradictions
Contradictions also surface within the area of safety BFOQs. Although
courts rarely uphold BFOQs based upon safety, the Supreme Court's decision in
Dothard v. Rawlinson is an exception.177 Safety BFOQ cases are often founded on
views of women's physical ability or vulnerability, and Dothard is no different.
There, the Supreme Court justified its decision to permit a safety BFOQ based
upon the "peculiarly inhospitable" environment of the prison.178 As a result of
the "rampant violence," "jungle atmosphere," and non-segregation of sex
offenders, the court found that a woman's ability to maintain order could be
reduced by her very womanhood.179 The Court concluded that women guards
would be more vulnerable to attack and harassment, particularly because
inmates were deprived of a "normal heterosexual environment [and] would
assault women because they were women."180 However, the record presented no
evidence that women guards created a greater danger to the prison's security
and nothing to support the risk that "inmates would assault a woman because
174.
175.
176.
177.
officer).
178.
179.
180.

340 F. Supp. 686, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Id.
See, e.g., Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1415–16; Hardin, 691 F.2d at 1374.
433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (finding that being male was a BFOQ for the position of correctional
Id. at 334.
Id. at 334–35.
Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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she was a woman."181 Furthermore, these beliefs ignore the fact that while
women, as a class, may be weaker than men, many individual women possess
greater strength than their male counterparts. Rejecting the entire class of
females, but permitting the entire class of males, based upon notions of relative
strength, is an inexact and inaccurate method of selection. Moreover, though
sexual assault against female guards may be more common, this does not take
away from the fact that male guards are also attacked, a concern the court
seemed to ignore. Without proof of the higher likelihood of female attack, it is
unlikely that the Court reached its conclusion without the assistance of some
gender stereotypes. In fact, this concern was highlighted in Justice Marshall's
dissent:
In short, the fundamental justification for the decision is that women as guards
will generate sexual assaults. With all respect, this rationale regrettably
perpetuates one of the most insidious of the old myths about women—that
women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects. The effect of the decision,
made I am sure with the best of intentions, is to punish women because their
very presence might provoke sexual assaults. It is women who are made to pay
the price in lost job opportunities for the threat of depraved conduct by prison
inmates. Once again, "[t]he pedestal upon which women have been placed
has . . . , upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage."182

C. Resolving the Inconsistencies
How do we reconcile the fact that courts have expressly forbid motives of
customer preference and stereotypes, but still allow the privacy BFOQ? First, it
is important to consider whether privacy motives are somehow distinctive from
other customer preference justifications. Although a privacy BFOQ is, at the
core, one of customer preference, courts faced with privacy matters often
consider them different and more valid than all other customer preference
matters. So much so, that most courts gloss over the fact that privacy
motivations are based on customer preference. Though some courts meet this
discrepancy head on and find that privacy interests are a distinct issue, others
completely ignore the inconsistency. This is, maybe in part, because privacy
concerns are often not based upon a customer's mere preference, but are so deeply
imperative that they are actually customer requirements. An unfulfilled privacy
customer preference or requirement may inflict a dignitary harm on an
individual, resulting in physical, emotional, or psychological damage.183 This
effect makes privacy preferences dissimilar from other customer preferences.
Whereas the patron of a restaurant might feel slightly less comfortable with a
male server, a patient requiring assistance with his or her intimate care may
actually suffer serious distress from cross-sex viewing or touching. This
increased gravity has been recognized by both scholars and courts. A leading

181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt J., concurring)
(describing the emotional harm and physical illness an inmate experienced after an intrusive crosssex body search).
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treatise explains, "Giving respect to deep-seated feelings of personal privacy
involving one's own genital areas is quite a different matter from catering to the
desire of some male airline passengers to have a little diluted sexual titillation
from the hovering presence of an attractive female flight attendant."184 Similarly,
in the case of Jordan v. Gardner, Judge Reinhardt's concurring opinion described
an inmate's physical aversion to cross-sex touching: "After an inmate was
searched by a male guard, her fingers had to be pried from the bars she had
grabbed; she returned to her cellblock, vomited, and broke down."185 Due to the
increased severity of consequences, privacy customer preferences may be
distinct from other customer preference motives.
Finally, privacy motives find express validation in the courts:186 "We cannot
conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to
shield one's unclothed figured [sic] from view of strangers, and particularly
strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and
personal dignity."187 The Backus court, for example, found that constitutional
privacy rights were at stake, explaining, "Defendant contends that if a male
nurse is performing these duties, the patient's constitutional right to privacy is
violated. We agree with the defendant."188 Although the Constitution does not
expressly provide a right to privacy, this right has been extracted from the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.189 However, these rights are
not unlimited, and the government's legitimate practices may sometimes
overpower individual privacy rights.190
Even though some courts validate BFOQs under a right to privacy theory,
others argue that no constitutional privacy right exists in the BFOQ
circumstance. Given that patients and customers are fully able to reject care from
members of the opposite sex, they argue that any constitutional right to privacy
is circumvented by their assent.191 Author Amy Kapczynski has taken a strong
stance against the existence of such a right, explaining:
The claim made in Backus that constitutional privacy rights are at stake in samesex privacy BFOQ cases is similarly flawed. The court does not make clear
where this right would come from or what its exact nature would be, but
consider the possible alternatives. If the court is imagining some sort of

184. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 3–43 Employment Discrimination § 43.02(3)(b)
(Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2008). See also Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871,
890 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting the same passage from the treatise); Torres v. Wisc. Dep't of Health &
Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting the same passage from the treatise).
185. 986 F.2d at 1534.
186. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); Backus v. Baptist Med.
Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Forts v.
Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.
1980).
187. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963).
188. 510 F. Supp. at 1193.
189. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
190. See Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical
Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 335 (1985).
191. See Kapczynski, supra note 133, at 1268 ("[E]very legal right that patients have to privacy is
rendered irrelevant by the fact that patients must consent to medical procedures.").
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penumbral right to same-sex privacy itself, rather than a choice of same-sex
privacy, from where does it derive the parameters of this right? If Title VII
violates this right when it requires hospitals to employ male nurses in labor and
delivery rooms, why does it not also violate it in all of the other wards of a
hospital or nursing home where patients receive intimate care? Furthermore, a
constitutional right to same-sex privacy would imply that such a right must be
protected by any healthcare provider that could be considered a state actor for
these purposes—but no one claims that a patient not granted a same-sex nurse
has a constitutional cause of action against the provider.192

Kapczynski is not alone in this opinion; several scholars agree that no
constitutional right to privacy exists in these BFOQ cases, creating yet another
incongruity in the case law.193 The Supreme Court has not provided any clarity
on the matter, leaving lower courts to address privacy BFOQ cases
inconsistently because of the lack of a single authoritative approach.
D. Other Viewpoints on the Causes of Inconsistency
The reasons for the aforementioned inconsistencies have been discussed by
other scholars as well. Robert Post has written extensively on the variation of
decisions produced under Title VII claims. Post finds that the "courts' rhetoric of
gender blindness does not explain their actual decisions in Title VII cases."194
Instead, he finds inconsistencies can be attributed to the fact that "Title VII does
not simply displace gender practices, but rather interacts with them in a
selective manner."195 He maintains that antidiscrimination law does not "liberate
individuals from the thrall of social 'stereotypes,'" but instead intervenes "only
to reshape the nature and content of social stereotypes."196 This is in part due to
his belief that antidiscrimination law itself is a social practice and that the law
regulates social practices once they become controversial.197 Similarly, authors
Mayer G. Freed and Daniel P. Polsby have found the BFOQ defense to be replete
with inconsistencies, explaining that nearly every requirement is subject to
"substantial qualification."198 They explain that BFOQ cases are often decided by
the use of "discretionary line drawing in which the courts are required to
exercise a judgment about the interaction of equality values and other social
norms."199 This discretionary line drawing results in inconsistent decisions due

192. Id. at 1270 (footnote and information in parenthesis omitted).
193. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 191, at 340–42 (stating that a constitutional right to privacy
"should be re-examined because statutorily mandated equal employment may not burden patient
privacy enough to establish a constitutional violation").
194. Yuracko, supra note 129, at 150 (citing ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES:
THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1–53 (2001)).
195. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 26 (2000).
196. ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (2001). This argument is developed further on pages 1–53.
197. Post, 88 CAL. L. REV. at 26-27.
198. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A
Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 6 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 583, 587 (1981).
199. Id. at 601.
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to the varying social values and norms.200 Therefore, they suggest a different
Title VII formulation to more adequately explain the current state of Title VII.201
Such a formulation would "recognize that although explicit sex classifications
are presumptively invalid, they can be justified where there are strong efficiency
interests at stake or where there is a broadly shared social norm that requires
that men and women be treated differently."202 Finally, Kimberly A. Yuracko
finds that "there is no plausible conception of business 'essence'" that can explain
the inconsistency in cases that allows customer preference to create a BFOQ in
some situations, but not in others.203 Yuracko similarly argues that social values
and preferences shape the decisions.204 If these scholars' opinions are correct, we
must question whether we are comfortable with courts crafting decisions that
interact with and accept currently held stereotypes and norms, instead of
eradicating them.
V. TITLE VII DOES NOT PROVIDE A BFOQ FOR RACE
An additional problem with the current application of the BFOQ defense is
its apparent unequal treatment of race and gender discrimination. Although
Title VII permits gender discrimination if motivated by a valid BFOQ defense, it
does not allow the same exception for a BFOQ based upon race or color.205 In
other words, Title VII maintains that discrimination based upon race is never
tolerable, but discrimination based upon gender is sometimes acceptable. This
incongruity seems to suggest the framers believed that there was something
inherently different between race and gender discrimination, or more simply,
that gender discrimination was not always a problem. Because the lack of a race
exception causes some BFOQ opponents to insist that a gender BFOQ is equally
uncalled for, the reasons for this dissimilarity are important to consider.
The lack of a race BFOQ exception is notable because, in reality, race-based
hiring occurs, even though Title VII does not provide an exception for it. Black
actors are cast to portray black characters, white undercover agents are hired to
infiltrate certain race-based hate groups (such as the Ku Klux Klan), and, when
necessary, police officers are assigned neighborhood patrols based upon race.
While Title VII forbids race-based hiring by excluding it as valid BFOQ
classification, there is no doubt that positions exist where people are staffed
based upon their race. One scholar has noted, "we ought to admit the possibility
of a BFOQ in the case of race, as federal law does not, because there seems
nothing harmful, in a realist production, in requiring that we have actors who
look—and sound—like people of whatever racial identity they are
representing."206 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has recognized race as a

200. See generally id.
201. Id. at 589.
202. Id.
203. See Yuracko, supra note 129, at 149, 212.
204. See generally id.
205. See generally Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment
Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color a BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2001).
206. K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41, 47 (2000).
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BFOQ within the confines of an equal protection case.207 Taking the above
information into consideration, it seems peculiar that a BFOQ based upon race
does not exist.
The absence of a race-based BFOQ has been recognized by courts and
scholars alike. Several courts have stated that Congress intentionally excluded
race and color as BFOQ defenses.208 Furthermore, the legislative history of Title
VII shows that Congress considered, but rejected a race-based BFOQ,209 where
the House of Representatives discussed and denied an amendment to the BFOQ
portion of the statute to include race and color.210 Congress' decision to exclude
race and color as permissible discriminatory classifications was due to the fact
that they found race discrimination to be more prevalent and harmful than other
forms of discrimination: "Title VII is a blanket prohibition of racial
discrimination, rational and irrational alike, even more so than of other forms of
discrimination attacked in Title VII."211 A Congressman who spoke in opposition
to the House of Representatives' proposed amendment to the BFOQ provision to
include race and color addressed this, explaining:
The trouble with the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi is
that it opens up a good deal more than the case of casting director looking for
actors to play certain roles in dramatic production. If it was limited to that, it
would be a lot more acceptable than it is. But it opens up other possibilities that
I do not think any of us would want to open.212

Undoubtedly, Congressman O'Hara was worried about the continued
discrimination a race-based BFOQ would allow. However, some scholars
believe that Congress may not have provided a race exception because the
members found it unnecessary, believing that Title VII did not outlaw all forms
of racial discrimination. For example, one member of the Senate asked whether
the Harlem Globetrotters or movie directors could still discriminate based on
race.213 The Senate was told that both groups would be exempt from Title VII's
ban on discriminatory hiring; the Harlem Globetrotters did not have enough
employees to be required to follow Title VII and movie directors could
discriminate based on physical appearance instead of race.214 Members of the
House of Representatives were under similar impressions. For example,
Congressman O'Hara stated: "In the example used, which involved a dramatic
performance, some particular role may require a person whose skin is of a
particular hue. I do not think that when you seek such person for that role, you
come within the meaning of the unfair practices described in this bill."215

207. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
208. Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982); Swint v. PullmanStandard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
209. See 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case).
210. See 110 CONG. REC. 2550–63 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Williams).
211. Rucker, 669 F.2d at 1181.
212. Id. (statement of Rep. O'Hara).
213. 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case).
214. Id.
215. 110 CONG. REC. 2556 (statement of Rep. O'Hara).
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Although other reasons may have been in play, the chief reason Congress
excluded a race-based BFOQ was the concern that any allowance of racial
discrimination would damage Title VII's effectiveness in prohibiting
discrimination. As Congressman Celler precisely explained in rejecting an
amendment to add race as a BFOQ, "[T]he basic purpose of Title VII is to
prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race or color. Now, the
substitute amendment, I fear would destroy this principle. It would permit
discrimination on the basis of race or color. It would establish a loophole that
could well gut this title."216 Strangely, Congressmen did not voice concerns that
the same setback would result from a gender-based BFOQ. But, why would a
loophole for race gut the statute, while a loophole for gender would not? One
likely explanation is that Congress fully realized a gender-based BFOQ would
produce the same consequence, but found such a result inconsequential. This
explanation is sensible, considering the diminished importance Congress placed
upon gender discrimination, as opposed to racial discrimination. Realizing that
this is a probable explanation, at least in part, one must consider whether the
beliefs effecting the creation of the gender BFOQ exception allow the defense to
remain appropriate today.
Therefore, when considering whether the gender-based BFOQ defense
should still be available, it is helpful to consider the reasons Congress excluded
a race-based BFOQ: they believed such an allowance would destroy the
principle of Title VII by permitting discrimination, and establish a loophole that
could gut the statute. Bearing in mind the lesser value Congress placed upon
eradicating gender discrimination,217 it is entirely possible that it fully realized a
gender-based BFOQ would similarly permit discrimination, while providing a
loophole for employers, but chose to disregard these consequences. If an attempt
was made to defeat the statute by adding gender as a protected category, it is
probable that many of the Congressmen voting for its passage did not consider
gender discrimination problematic. In fact, if it was feasible that Congress
would go so far as to reject the legislation in its entirety because of the inclusion
of gender, it is possible that that the Congressmen actually endorsed the practice
of gender discrimination, or at least turned a blind eye towards it. When Title
VII was enacted, the country, or at least the majority of its leaders, had finally
acknowledged that racial discrimination was wrong. However, gender
discrimination was still common, and overwhelmingly accepted. Societal
perceptions of working women and their abilities have significantly advanced
since that time. If views of gender discrimination have changed, it is important
to question whether the gender BFOQ defense needs to be altered, or even
eliminated, to reflect these less discriminatory beliefs.
VI. DO REAL GENDER DIFFERENCES SUPPORT THE BFOQ DEFENSE?
The BFOQ defense is rooted in the belief that some very real and
unavoidable differences exist between women and men that can cause one
216. Id. at 2556 (statement of Rep. Celler).
217. See supra, note 11 (As noted, gender was not even included as a protected classification
within the original construction of Title VII. It was added at the last minute by a Congressman
hoping to prevent passage of Title VII).
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gender to be better equipped for a position than the other. Furthermore, in
providing a gender-based BFOQ defense, but not one based upon race, Congress
has suggested that gender differences are either more significant or more
genuine than those based upon race. To determine whether the BFOQ's
authorization of gender-based hiring are appropriate, it is important to consider
whether real gender differences do exist and, if they do, whether they are innate
or learned traits. Certainly, it is not an uncommon belief that with all other
variables being equal, a candidate of one gender may be better equipped for
some positions than a candidate of the opposite gender. This belief is neither as
common nor as acceptable, however, when the two equal candidates are of
different races. There is a widespread belief that men and women are innately
different and the BFOQ provisions further validate and promote this sentiment
by conveying that men and women are, at times, unequally qualified for certain
employment opportunities. While the notion of innate differences between
women and men is certainly widespread, is it arguable whether this belief is
actually accurate and well-founded. It may, instead, be based on false and
outdated stereotypes persisting from earlier times of rampant gender
discrimination and significant hiring inequities.
Although a BFOQ defense cannot legally be based upon stereotypes, it is
questionable which gender differences attributing to BFOQs are real and which
differences are, in reality, only perceived due to pervasive stereotypes.
Countless studies have undertaken the examination of the differences between
men and women, some finding statistical differences in skill sets, emotional
traits, and cognitive processes.218 Though gender differences are measured in
many experiments, it is still unclear whether such differences are real, or if some
other factor is causing performance differences. This determination is especially
difficult since some studies find no differences after outside variables are
controlled for, while others still find significant differences between the sexes.219
Nevertheless, the following discussion examines the generalizations that can be
made.
A. Measured Gender Differences
Men and women do exhibit some differences that could be relevant to their
employability or suitability for certain positions. One particular focus of
research has been on men's independence versus women's interdependence.
Studies show that women experience more relationship-linked emotions and are
more attuned to others' relationships.220 Women focus more on personal
relationships, while men focus on tasks and on connections with large groups.221
Furthermore, "men gravitate disproportionately to jobs that enhance inequalities
(prosecuting attorney, corporate advertising); women gravitate to jobs that
reduce inequalities (public defender, advertising work for a charity)."222 Studies
examining gender and communication also show differences between men's and
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 180–97 (7th ed. 2002).
See infra Part VI.
Supra note 218, at 179–80.
Id. at 180.
Id.
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women's communication styles. Whereas men tend to be directive, task-focused
leaders, women are social leaders who focus on team spirit.223 Men place a
higher priority on winning, getting ahead, and dominating others.224 Though
men and women rarely score differently on intelligence tests overall, men
demonstrate better spatial and mathematical reasoning abilities, while women
perform better on tasks of verbal memory and distinguishing similar objects.225
Not surprisingly, measured differences correlate with commonly held
stereotypes of the sexes, making it difficult to know whether these findings are
the result of genetic dispositions or socialization.
B. Stereotypes May be Causing these Differences
Although some studies find differences between males and females, these
findings may be partially due to outside factors rather than actual
dissimilarities. Studies have consistently shown that gender-based stereotypes
regularly cause women to underperform or perform inaccurately.226 The
phenomenon known as the Pygmalion effect can arise when an individual
performs better or worse, based upon the expectations of others.227 In this
process, other people's expectations are internalized by the individual, and he or
she performs in accordance with those expectations. This effect has been
extensively observed in testing situations where one group is expected to
perform better or worse than another.228 Given that most people unknowingly
employ stereotyped assumptions based upon male and female abilities, this
effect could easily trigger test results that measure differences in the
performance of male and female subjects.
Furthermore, in what is known as a stereotype threat situation, impaired
performance results from an individual's fear that his or her performance will
confirm an existing stereotype of a group to which he or she belongs.229
Countless studies have documented gender differences when subjects have been
informed that one gender performs better on the task at hand. For example, in
one study men and women with similar math backgrounds were given a math
test.230 When informed that the two genders were expected to perform equally
on the test, no gender differences were found.231 However, when told that men
normally scored higher, women's test scores dropped dramatically.232 In another

223. Id. at 183.
224. Id.
225. Diane F. Halpern, Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities, 292 (3d ed. 2000).
226. Mara Cardinu et al., Why Do Women Underperform Under Stereotype Threat? Evidence for the
Role of Negative Thinking, 16 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, 572, 572–578 (2005). See also Gender Stereotypes
Can Affect Men's and Women's Test Performance in Math, Study Shows, Sept. 25, 2006 (available at
http://www.nyu.edu/public.affairs/releases/detail/1207).
227. GARY P. LATHAM, WORK MOTIVATION: HISTORY, THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 214–15
(Sage Publications, Inc., 2007).
228. Id.
229. See MYERS, supra note 218, at 344–45.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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study, men and women university students were given a math test.233 When the
women tested alongside other women, they scored significantly better than
those testing with men.234 These findings can easily be translated to the
employment context. Since gender stereotypes seem to permeate most
workplaces, it is possible that in performance-based evaluations, women may
underperform. This underperformance should be even more prevalent in male
dominated areas, or in positions were women feel they are not the preferred
gender.235 Moreover, numerous studies have found that when the effects of
stereotypes are controlled for, women's test scores are no different than those of
men.236 Therefore, if gender differences are measured, it is still unclear if outside
factors, such as the Pygmalion effect or stereotype threat, are at play. The fact
that commonly accepted gender differences sometimes trigger performance
disparities should concern those who support the BFOQ defense, or argue for its
expansion. Furthermore, even if these gender differences are accepted as
accurate reflections of the participant's skills and behaviors, we must question
whether any of the differences are significant or important enough to permit
gender-based hiring procedures.
C. It is Unclear Whether Measured Differences are Innate or Socially Learned
Even if we accept that differences do exist between men and women, it still
remains unclear whether such disparities result from innate or socially learned
behaviors. This debate over whether behaviors, skills, and traits are ascertained
primarily through nature or nurture has created what has been deemed a "bitter
divide" in academia, with no clear consensus of belief.237 For those trying to
understand whether the BFOQ defense is harmful, however, this is an important
debate. While some scholars contend that men and women are innately
different, others maintain that any real differences result from the socialization
that occurs after birth.238 If measured differences between women and men are
the result of socialization, the stereotypes that cause this socialization (which the
BFOQ, at times, validates) further accentuate and prolong these gender
differences. Thus, if gender differences are learned, there is a very real concern
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Of course, these stereotypes would also cause men to underperform in female dominated
areas.
236. See MYERS, supra note 218, at 344–45. See also Michael Johns et al., Knowing is Half the Battle,
16 PSYCHOLOGY SCIENCE, 175, 175–179 (2005) (finding that when women were not informed of the
stereotype threat they performed worse than men on a test, but when informed of the threat they did
not).
237. Matt Crenson, Nature Versus Nurture Divides Academia: Some See Merit in Saying Biology may
have Role in Gender Inequalities, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/02/28/nature_vs_nurture_divides_academia
; Steven Pinker, Why Nature and Nurture Won't Go Away, DÆDALUS (2004) (available at
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/papers/nature_nurture.pdf).
238. See generally Kingsley R. Brown, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of
the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971 (1995); ROBERT PLOMIN, GENETICS AND
EXPERIENCE: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATURE AND NURTURE (1994); Robert Plomin & C. S.
Bergeman. The Nature of Nurture: Genetic Influences on "Environmental" Measures, 14 BEHAVIORAL AND
BRAIN SCIENCES 373 (1991).
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that the BFOQ defense may be promoting differences, preserving the status quo,
and prolonging gender discrimination. The theory of socialization is supported
by strong research, with findings that most, if not all differences result from
learned behaviors.239
It is indisputable that men and women are socialized to take on genderspecific roles, as gender stereotyping permeates all aspects of life. From the
moment that we enter the world we are taught the way to act, the tasks to do,
and the jobs to choose. Divisions of labor and responsibility in the home and
professional world teach us the proper way in which to act and interact. This, of
course, results in men more often using and developing more stereotypical
masculine skills and women perfecting more stereotypical feminine skills.
Socialization creates a cycle in which the current gender-role stereotypes are
taught and internalized from generation to generation.240 If the BFOQ defense
allows employers to hire based upon stereotypical notions of gender differences,
the theory of socialization illustrates how harmful the defense may be. If society
internalizes legally protected gender-role divisions, the BFOQ may be furthering
the cycle of gender inequality.
D. Employment Opportunities are Not Equal
Regardless of whether the presumed differences are due to innate
differences or social stereotypes, it is undeniable that women fair far worse in
their employment opportunities. Women, as a group, are significantly less likely
to be found in high ranking, high prestige, and high paying positions. Though
Title VII, the supposed equalizer, has been in place for over forty years, women
still earn only 74 percent of what men earn.241 While some rightfully argue that
other variables are at play in this figure, research finds that those variables
cannot fully account for this large of a gap.242 Overall, men do have higher levels
of education and more experience in the labor market.243 Nevertheless, several
studies aimed at isolating the effects of productivity-related factors, such as
education and time spent in the labor market, show that 25 to 50 percent of the
26 percent pay gap cannot be explained by such factors.244 Furthermore, it has
been suggested that as much as 13 of the 26 percent pay gap can be attributed to
gender discrimination.245 Title VII was enacted to fight the prevalent
discrimination in the country's labor market, and requires gender-neutral hiring
practices in this endeavor. However, when the BFOQ permits gender
discriminatory hiring in certain circumstances, this may in fact decrease the
statute's fighting power.

239.
240.
241.

See generally Brown, supra note 238.
Id. at 1104.
E. Christopher Murray, Commentary: The Sad Truth: Gender Pay Gap Still a Problem, LONG
ISLAND BUSINESS NEWS, Oct. 5, 2007.
242. Id. See also Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers III, How Does Gender Play a Role in the
Earnings Gap? An Update, 14 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 9 (Mar. 2003).
243. See Murray, supra note 241.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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The risks inherent in the approval of a gender-based BFOQ are increasingly
evident if one believes that gender differences are caused, even in part, by
socialization based on existing stereotypes. A federal statute, such as Title VII,
that allows employers to utilize gender-based hiring sends a message that at
times, society, or at least its leaders, permits and agrees with gender
discrimination. By allowing employers to exclusively hire men as prison guards
and women as nurses, an underlying message surfaces that men are strong and
powerful (and women are weak and unfit to act as prison guards) and that
women are better caretakers and nurturers (and men are unfit for caretaking
roles). A BFOQ defense that permits such gender-based hiring may only
encourage and prolong these harmful stereotypes.
E. Gender Differences in the Privacy Context
Although it may be unclear whether qualification differences between
women and men are real or perceived, in the privacy context, such skill
differences become irrelevant. When a BFOQ is cited due to privacy concerns, it
is not because of perceived gender-based abilities, but is based upon the gender
of the applicant alone. In other words, when an employer partakes in
discriminatory hiring due to privacy, it rejects applicants of the wrong gender
precisely because of their gender, not due to a lack of skills or traits associated
with their gender. For example, when employers argue for privacy-based
BFOQs to permit the hiring of a female nurse for the intimate care of female
patients it is not because of the nurse's superior caretaking skills nor the
stereotype that she can provide more nurturing care, but is argued solely upon
the fact that she is a woman. Accordingly, in the privacy context, physiological
gender differences exclusive of any gender-role stereotypes really do seem to
matter. Noticeably, courts have supported this belief.246 Therefore, arguments
that men and women are no different often fall on deaf ears.
VII. SHOULD THE BFOQ DEFENSE STILL BE AVAILABLE?
Although Title VII only permits gender-based hiring in a very narrow
subset of circumstances, it still expressly allows some gender discrimination to
occur. Strong arguments exist both for and against the BFOQ. The most
frequently cited opposition to the BFOQ centers around the perception that the
defense is harmful to women. However, as later discussed, some evidence
contradicts this assumption. While some contend that the BFOQ defense should
be expanded to conform to societal values and actual court decisions that accept
gender-based hiring, on the other end are those who maintain that the BFOQ
should be completely abolished because it results in the subordination of
women and the prolongation of gender stereotypes. In the middle of these two
polar opinions are two more moderate views. Some believe that the defense is
absolutely essential for the workability of Title VII, and should stay exactly as is.
Finally, some scholars argue that the defense should be narrowed to permit only
the most essential cases of discrimination.
246. See, e.g., Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
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A. Arguments Supporting the BFOQ Defense
Several arguments supporting the BFOQ defense, founded in different
schools of thought, offer convincing justifications that favor this defense. The
sheer fact that the BFOQ exception was suggested, accepted, and placed on the
books attests to the fact that many individuals believed in its legitimacy and
necessity. Title VII expressly states that the BFOQ defense is permitted only
when "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business. . . ."247 The words of the statute inform readers that the framers
believed in its necessity.
Economists often support the BFOQ defense, finding that it is needed for
the efficient functioning of the economy. Accordingly, economists oppose the
inefficiency that results from requirements that employers must equally hire
both men and women, no matter the cost, for positions that customers would
prefer one gender to fill.248 Some economists argue for the elimination of Title
VII completely, or alternatively, for an expansion of the BFOQ to further cater to
customer preferences.249 They maintain that permitting a BFOQ based upon
customer preference would be more efficient overall because customers seek out
their preferences regardless of the law. Thus, permitting a BFOQ defense would
avert wasted efforts; it would prevent customers from wasting valuable time
and effort seeking businesses that suit their preferences and prevent employers
from wasting time, resources, and money attempting to circumvent the law.
Finally, business owners and pro-business advocates argue that employers
should have the right to run their businesses as they see fit, including hiring
whomever they deem appropriate. Employers further argue they should have a
right to staff their businesses with employees they choose and to increase profits
and popularity by employing whomever their customers prefer. If businesses
are not given complete control over their hiring decisions, employers believe
that they should at least be offered an affirmative defense when gender-based
hiring is a substantial factor in their success.
Though arguments against the BFOQ typically focus upon its detrimental
affects on women, supporters respond that it permits discrimination against
men as well. A consideration of the most common situations where the BFOQ is
permitted illustrates that the majority of circumstances actually encourage the
hiring of female employees. Certainly within the commercial sex industry,
consisting of strip clubs, gentlemen's clubs, escort services, and sexually explicit
men's magazines, nearly all businesses cater to men through the employment of
females. A BFOQ is allowable within that sex appeal arena, permitting
employers to discriminate against men in hiring, because the essence of most sex
trade businesses is to sell sexual titillation to heterosexual men, which is
triggered by the sex appeal of women. While there are some sex trade
businesses that cater to women or homosexual men, they remain only a small

247.
248.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 76–77 (1992); J. Hoult Verkerke, Book Review: Free to Search, Forbidden Grounds:
The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2080–81 (1992).
249. See EPSTEIN, supra note 248, at 299–309.
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portion of the sex industry.250 Thus, within the majority of commercial sex
companies, men will be the ones discriminated against in hiring.
Additionally, within the privacy field, it is much more likely for employers
to discriminate in favor of women. Due to society's double standard of
permitting women to view males, but often renouncing mens' viewing of
females, women will likely be hired disproportionably more often based on
privacy concerns. Privacy-based BFOQs favor women, in part, due to the fact
that women are more likely to request female caretakers for their intimate care.
Thus, forbidding the BFOQ gender-based hiring that favors women would
likely result in two consequences: (1) a reduction in women's employment
within these positions if employers are forced to fill some of the positions with
men, and (2) the diminishing of these job opportunities all together as some
businesses will fail because of their inability to cater to client demands and/or
privacy concerns. In view of this, a strong argument can be made for the
continuation of the BFOQ defense, given that it may actually be helping, not
harming women by providing an increase in employment opportunities.
Furthermore, without the current allowances of the BFOQ defense,
women's privacy concerns would be disregarded. Women, on the whole, are
much more likely to experience discomfort with cross-sex viewing or touching.
For some individuals, privacy invasions may cause serious psychological and
emotional harm. Ordinarily, courts have been sympathetic to these concerns,
often permitting gender-based hiring or staffing. However, with the eradication
of the BFOQ defense, employers would be strictly forbidden from continuing
this practice. Accordingly, patients would, at times, have no option other than to
be subjected to cross-sex viewing or touching. Given that privacy is a value
deeply held by the majority of Americans, this should cause doubt for the
workability of the full elimination of the BFOQ defense.
Although many complain of the harm the BFOQ defense causes women, as
later discussed, some feminists argue in favor of the BFOQ defense, even when
it places women in positions of commodification.251 Those deemed as liberal
feminists view commodification as a means to an end and assert that women
should be empowered to choose for themselves whether to sell their sex, or sex
appeal, as a commodity.252 To further allow women this option, some liberal
feminists argue for expanding the current BFOQ exceptions. They contend that
occupations in which women are commodified often provide higher wages than
those women could otherwise obtain.253 In some circumstances, women may
even use these more lucrative jobs as a means to rise out of low-income, deadend employment and pursue better opportunities. In support of this argument,
250. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 129, at 183 ("[T]here is a much greater demand for the
commodification and sale of female sexuality than there is demand for the commodification and sale
of male sexuality.").
251. See, e.g., Ann Lucas, The Currency of Sex: Prostitution, Law and Commodification, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 248, 248 (Martha M.
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005); Kathy Miriam, Stopping the Traffic in Women: Power, Agency
and Abolition in Feminist Debates over Sex-Trafficking, 36 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (2005)
(discussing differing views feminists take on commodification).
252. See generally Miriam, supra note 251.
253. Id.
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Melissa Ditmore of the Network of Sex Projects testified before the U.N., "Many
people opt for sex work because it is less degrading, better paying and provides
more freedom than other available options."254 Many feminists also argue
against efforts to eradicate the BFOQ because they believe that women do not
need to be paternalistically protected from commodification. Some economists
also follow this line of reasoning, arguing that a more efficient marketplace is
created when women have the choice to make money by whatever means they
see fit, including the selling of their sexual appeal.255 Clearly, multiple
arguments support the continuation (or even extension) of the BFOQ defense.
B. Arguments Opposing the BFOQ Defense
Arguments opposing the BFOQ defense are also plentiful. The main
concern with the defense stems from the negative effects discriminatory hiring
has on the employment opportunities of the excluded and included sex.256
Gender-based hiring is harmful because it limits the types of positions that
individuals may apply for and fill. Furthermore, given the historical roles of
women and men in the workplace, there is a heightened concern that genderbased hiring will have a disproportionately more detrimental effect on women.
Positions typically associated with men are likely to be higher paying and to
have higher prestige than positions associated with females. As such, without
gender discrimination laws, men would more often be hired for higher pay,
higher prestige positions such as businessmen, doctors, lawyers, executives, and
other higher powered, management positions, while women would more often
be hired for lower pay, lower prestige positions such as secretaries, child care
workers, teachers, nurses, and other care-related non-management positions.
Without employment discrimination laws, job segregation would lead to job
stratification, and result in lower-status and lower pay employment for
women.257 Nevertheless, even if sex-based hiring is more likely to harm women
overall, it will have detrimental effects on men's employment opportunities too,
especially for men entering into professions historically dominated by females.
The most significant problem with the BFOQ defense occurs because of the
validating effect it has on current gender stereotypes. Permitting sexual
stereotypes reinforces them, allowing them to carry on far into the future.
What's more, legal reinforcement sends a much stronger message than social
reinforcement. By its very nature, the BFOQ defense contributes to gender
stereotyping by legitimating gender discrimination. Authors Katherine Bartlett
and Deborah Rhode acknowledge this concern, explaining:
On the one hand, it may be reasonable to hire based on sex when the
employment at issue implicates privacy or therapeutic interests that are gender

254. Melissa Ditmore, Network of Sex Work Projects, Addressing Sex Work as Labour, Prepared
for the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery (Geneva, Jan. 21, 1999).
255. See Miriam, supra note 251, at 5–9.
256. See, e.g., Suzanne Wilhelm, Perpetuating Stereotypical Views of Women: The Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification Defense in Gender Discrimination Under Title VII, 28 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 73
(2007) (finding that the BFOQ defense hurts women by keeping jobs sex segregated, fosters the view
that women are weak and need protected, and symbolically degrading women).
257. See McGinley, supra note 99, at 273–74.
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related and the preference does not derive from harmful stereotypes. . . . On the
other hand, applying the BFOQ exception in this context would seem to
perpetuate age-old stereotypes that Title VII was meant to condemn—i.e.,
women's role washing and cleaning up after people, and men's role as the
skilled professionals.258

Furthermore, even when discrimination is "based upon accurate
stereotypes or generalizations, and [is] cost/benefit-justified, [it] nonetheless has
undesirable social consequences," such as "perpetuat[ing] the social realities that
make the predictions accurate," "reinforce[ing] biases and other inaccurate
stereotypes," and "freezing . . . the underlying social reality."259 Even courts have
recognized this problem: "Is it significant that preferences for privacy from
members of the opposite sex may be entirely culturally created, and that by
recognizing such preferences the courts may encourage sex differences at the
expense of equality in employment?"260 Thus, there is a very real concern that a
BFOQ defense may be solidifying gender stereotypes into law. The possibility
that the very statute meant to alleviate gender discrimination may actually
perpetuate the discrimination is undoubtedly troubling.
Furthermore, some scholars believe that the areas in which the BFOQ is
currently permitted are illegitimate based upon the requirements of the
defense.261 As discussed previously, the case holdings on the BFOQ defense are
inconsistent and, at times, difficult to reconcile. In privacy cases, courts often
allow customer preferences to direct BFOQ defenses, but other courts have
stated that customer preferences can never permit a BFOQ. Furthermore,
scholars argue that, at the core, almost every BFOQ defense is based upon
customer preferences.262 Since customer preference is expressly prohibited as a
motive for gender discriminatory hiring, some argue that nearly all BFOQ
defenses should be prohibited.263 Additionally, some scholars argue that the
privacy concerns of patients or clients do not meet the main criterion of a valid
BFOQ, since the essence of the business would not be undermined without
gender-based hiring. What's more, Title VII is meant to change customer
preferences, not cater to them.264 Because these scholars do not find such
motives legitimate, they argue for either a severe limitation or full elimination of
the defense.
Opponents of the BFOQ cite the additional concern that the BFOQ defense
is founded upon normative assumptions, many of which are outdated. Author
Sharon M. McGown suggests that courts employ the following normative,
paternalistic assumptions in order to permit BFOQs: (1) the likelihood that
physical and sexual assault is prevalent in environments of confinement; (2)
258. KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 116–17 (4th ed. 2006).
259. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes,
and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 169–72 (1992).
260. Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 838 F.2d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 1988).
261. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 133; Calloway, supra note 190; Wilhelm, supra note 256.
262. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 129, at 505–09 (explaining that "[u]ltimately, all BFOQ defenses
are based on consumer preferences.").
263. See Wilhelm, supra note 256.
264. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
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cross-sex observation causes a "dignity harm" for the individual observed; (3)
sexual modesty is the mark of a civilized society; and (4) sex-segregation is a
necessary for any effective rehabilitation program.265 Each of the above
normative justifications is then followed by further normative assumptions. For
example, when courts maintain that physical and sexual assault against women
is likely to occur in environments of confinement, McGown finds that they then
make further assumptions that women are too weak for certain jobs and that
only women are sexually vulnerable.266 McGown notes that within courts'
framing of BFOQ cases based upon the dignity harms from cross-sex
observation, courts make judgments that modesty, especially women's, deserves
protection and that cross-sex observation is particularly harmful.267
It is also concerning that in justifying BFOQ defenses, courts sometimes
make decisions based upon stereotyped assumptions that are unfounded.268
Often, these normative assumptions further preserve the status quo of
inequality and involve the paternalistic treatment of women, both of which are
motives Title VII aims to prevent. For those opposed to the BFOQ defense, this
remains a serious complaint.
Though many BFOQ opponents agree that the defense should be restricted,
they disagree over how severe further limitations should be.269 Some opponents
maintain that the BFOQ should be completely eliminated because of the
multiple problems involved in the BFOQ's authorization of discriminatory
hiring. Other opponents argue that abolishment of the defense is impractical,
but that it should be greatly restricted.270 The question of what should be
prohibited and what should be permitted is not an easy one to answer. Some
maintain that the only allowable BFOQ should be that of authenticity, because it
really is necessary for the believability of certain roles. Others are slightly more
lenient, finding that a privacy-based BFOQ defense should still be permitted in
the limited situations where a business would truly fail without discriminatory
hiring.271 Those with a more strict approach often find that Title VII expressly
forbids BFOQ defenses because all motives, even authenticity, are based upon
customer preference.272 This approach, therefore, renders the BFOQ exception
useless and prohibits any hiring based upon gender.
C. The Author's Stance
Strong arguments weigh both for and against the continuation of the BFOQ
defense and its current parameters. It is unquestionable that genderdiscriminatory hiring practices do inflict some losses on both sexes. Genderbased hiring restricts individuals' employment opportunities, sometimes forcing
265. Sharon M. McGown, The Bona Fide Body: Title VII's Last Bastion of Intentional Sex
Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 88–120 (2003).
266. Id. at 89–96.
267. Id. at 101–08.
268. See generally id.
269. Compare Kapczynski, supra note 133, with Wilhelm, supra note 256 and Berman, supra note 59.
270. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 59.
271. Id.
272. Wilhelm, supra note 256.
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qualified applicants into lower paid positions. Discriminatory hiring also
validates and prolongs gender stereotypes, instead of eradicating them. Often,
this is done in a manner that is subordinates and harms women. Furthermore,
most successful BFOQ motives are, at their core, founded on customer
preference. The very statute with an objective of eradicating stereotypes, at
times, inconsistently endorses them.
Endorsement of any law that results in such a significant assortment of
problems should cause hesitation. After careful consideration, I conclude that
elimination of the BFOQ defense is not the solution for this slew of problems.
The defense is not only valuable, but also absolutely essential, for the realistic
functioning of Title VII. Accordingly, I argue that the statute should remain fully
intact. Although inconsistencies within case law support arguments to expand
the defense, any expansion to further cater to discriminatory customer
preferences and stereotypical impressions is dangerous, regardless of its
efficiency.273
Although the eradication of gender discrimination should be a top priority,
it is not paramount. We live in a society in which gender roles are so deeply
engrained within our conceptions and understanding of appropriateness of
social interactions, that BFOQ defenses are, at times, an inevitable necessity.
Within the privacy context, the elimination of gender-based hiring is both
unrealistic and undesirable.274 While gender differences resulting from
stereotypes and socialization are alarming, it is naïve to argue that such
distinctions are never necessary.
Even though this validation of gender discrimination causes discomfort, I,
like most of society, am willing to accept that consequence here. To be effective
and operative, laws must interact with and accept some shared societal values.
Consequently, any gender discrimination statute that provides absolutely no
appreciation for the values of privacy and rehabilitation would be unworkable
and ineffective. Thus, I find that the elimination of the BFOQ defense is an
undesirable and unworkable approach to further reducing gender
discrimination.
Some may argue that this opinion is irresponsible or inattentive to the
eradication of discrimination. At this note's outset, I may have agreed. After all,
current BFOQ jurisprudence allows both stereotypes and customer preference to
dictate the law and furthers discriminatory notions by allowing them to legally
subsist. Considering that society felt similarly tolerant of racial discrimination
only forty years ago, it is important to be cognizant of the situation's parallels.
Beliefs that African-Americans and whites are inherently different, although not
generally accepted today, were prevalent before the enactment of Title VII. Since
then, racial discrimination has significantly decreased, in large part, as a result
273. Although I realize preserving the statute quo does not alleviate the current problem with
the inconsistencies within the privacy field, I find it less problematic to allow some inconsistency in
decisions than to further expand the accessibility of discrimination. While I do not support any
alteration of the current statute, clarification from the Supreme Court on the availability of a privacy
defense would be beneficial.
274. See Silvka v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp., 594 S.E.2d 616, 625–26 (W.Va. 2004) (Maynard, J.
dissenting) (explaining that "the privacy concerns at issue here are basic to human nature which has
been essentially unchanged for thousands of years").
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of initially unpopular legislation that fully forbid racial discrimination. This
result provides some support to arguments for a complete ban of gender-based
hiring. Social beliefs of gender differences have decreased since the passage of
Title VII, much like racial differences, yet they have not disappeared. With even
stricter gender discrimination laws, some argue, discrimination will further
decline. However, I do not find the complete eradication of gender differences
desirable, as I do with race. There are inherent differences between males and
females, physiological and otherwise, which are not present between the
races.275
At some point, the desirability of a BFOQ defense turns to a normative
argument in which we must question the value of recognizing gender
differences. Although most would agree that the acknowledgement of racial
differences is inappropriate, the desirability of gender differences is not as clear
cut. We must balance the right to equal employment opportunities against the
rights of consumer privacy and both employer and employee autonomy.
Lawmakers must mediate between these competing interests and attempt to
achieve the most appropriate balance. Often, lawmaking is a process of selecting
the lesser of two evils, and this process is undoubtedly apparent with the BFOQ
defense. Accordingly, I believe that the defense, as currently written,
accomplishes its desired goals. The exception, as is, forbids most forms of
discrimination, but still permits gender-based hiring in narrow circumstances,
such as privacy and rehabilitation.276 Consideration of the legislative history
leads me to believe this is precisely what the framers had in mind. Admittedly,
the defense is not without serious fault. But, in light of the balancing of interests
it must achieve, I see no superior alternative.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The BFOQ defense is not without significant downfalls. It has been
interpreted inconsistently. Courts have allowed community norms and
stereotypic beliefs to infiltrate their decisions. At times, the defense even
operates to the detriment of both women and men. Furthermore, judicial
acceptance of gender differences promotes and sustains gender stereotypes
using a statute meant to eradicate them. These faults are both relevant and
important. Nevertheless, no matter how troubling the downfalls are, elimination
of the BFOQ defense is not the appropriate solution. Without the BFOQ, Title
VII would not remain a fully functional statute. In reality, society and its leaders
have decided that some values trump the importance of eradicating gender
discrimination, and the BFOQ is needed to protect those values. Consequently,
regardless of the various problems inherent in the availability of a BFOQ
exception, the defense should remain as it has been for the past 44 years.

275. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256 at *7
(W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (explaining that while there are no complaints regarding the race or
national origin of nurses, there are many objections based upon gender).
276. The defense also permits gender-based hiring in authenticity circumstances and extremely
limited safety situations. I do not take issue with these motives, but also do not consider them to be
as valuable as privacy and rehabilitation motivations.

